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Guest Editorial
Overview
I NFORMATION security plays an important and increas-ingly critical role in society. It is, therefore, essential that we
have effective tools and techniques to design and evaluate secure
systems and demonstrate that they meet their security require-
ments. The application of rigorous methods to the specification,
modeling, analysis, and design of security-critical systems has
made considerable strides in recent years, and the field is rapidly
gaining in maturity.
The aim of this special edition is to bring together some of the
best, recent, developments in the use of mathematically well-
founded techniques and tools for the modeling and analysis of
security-critical systems. We believe that the time is now ripe
for such a snapshot: the area has reached a sufficient degree
of maturity that such tools and techniques are now regularly
applied to real, commercial products and designs. At the same
time there are still many open questions and challenges and it
remains a very dynamic area of research.
It was recognized early on that to achieve predictability, and
hence dependability, in the design and implementation of crit-
ical systems it is necessary to apply more systematic techniques
to their development and evaluation than simple ad hoc code
cutting. Many approaches have been proposed that vary widely
and involve differing degrees of rigor and formality. Thus, at
the more informal end of the spectrum, we have structured sys-
tems, analysis, and design methodology (SSADM), the Jackson
Development method, and so on. However, for systems whose
correct operation was considered critical, the need for more rig-
orous and mathematical techniques and concepts was recog-
nized.
The security community appreciated early on the need for
rigorous, ideally formal, approaches to the modeling and anal-
ysis of designs and implementations. Much of the early work
in developing automated support for the verification of designs
against security requirements was stimulated and funded by the
organizations such as the National Security Agency (NSA). The
Gypsy system developed at Computational Logic, Inc. (CLI)
and the hierarchical development method (HDM) developed at
Stanford Research Institute (SRI) are prime examples.
In the 1970s, a number of major projects had formal methods
applied in the development process. By and large these expe-
riences were disappointing: the time and effort involved was
very high and the benefits derived highly debatable. A number
of reasons for this lack of success have been proposed but it
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seems likely that the methods were at that stage too immature
and the projects they were applied to too ambitious. Attempts
were made, for example, to verify trusted operating systems that
were way beyond the techniques of the time, or probably even
of current techniques. In particular, since security properties are
generally not functional capabilities, but pervasive constraints
on the way all parts of a system behave, it is difficult to verify
them conclusively from a description of a limited aspect of a
system.
A further difficulty was the fact that design and evaluation
processes tended to be conducted quite separately. This meant
that the evaluation had little or no chance to influence the de-
sign, in particular little opportunity to steer the design toward
architectures more amenable to analysis. The most damning ob-
servation is that in several cases the deployed design had drifted
so far from the design that had been handed over to the analysts
that the output was rendered virtually irrelevant.
These rather bad early experiences gave rise to a crisis of
confidence in the community and a rather poor image to the
whole idea of proofs of system dependability. Around this time
a pair of workshops sponsored by the U.S., U.K., and Cana-
dian governments were convened to discuss the role and rel-
evance of formal methods in critical systems [1], [4]. As R.
Morris, then Chief Scientist at the National Computer Security
Center (NCSC) put it: “The question is: ‘Where do I put my
extra $5 of verification money?’”. The conclusions were, very
broadly, that formal methods do have a useful role to play but
must be used in conjunction with other techniques like testing.
It was also observed that notations like Vienna development
method and the Z notation (VDM, Z), etc., could be usefully de-
ployed even without necessarily performing proofs: the process
of casting requirements and high-level designs in a formal no-
tation itself served to greatly sharpen understanding and reduce
bugs in implementations.
After this rather unpromising start, the community has, over
the past decade or so, turned things around and chalked up some
significant successes. This is due to the growing maturity and
effectiveness of the tools and methods. Theorem provers have
moved on from the Boyer–Moore days of “pushing on one end
of the string” and are now much more usable, with more intu-
itive interfaces and better automation of the tedious steps of the
proofs. Model-checkers have also made major strides and have
been making a significant impact beyond their original area of
application to hardware verification.
In addition, success has followed more careful focus on spe-
cific modeling contexts. Verifying the security of an operating
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system is intractable partly because interactions occur at many
different levels of abstraction, so that the verification is not com-
plete until they have all been considered. By contrast, working
within a particular modeling framework focuses attention on
a particular class of problems that can arise; it is significant
progress to prove that a protocol or smart card avoids a class of
problems. Many of the papers in this issue devote a good deal
of attention to finding a useful modeling framework. A mod-
eling framework must be somewhat restrictive, so that verifica-
tion goals can be sharply defined, and strong methods be devel-
oped to achieve them. However, it must also be realistic, so that a
wide range of practical troubles have been eliminated when cor-
rectness is proved within the model. A natural part of scientific
development is discovering more inclusive models that remain
tractable to work with, or alternative models that can eliminate
new classes of problems.
On a similar timescale, information security has moved from
being primarily the preserve of governments and the military to
being a major concern of society at large. This is due mainly
to fact that we are increasingly moving into an age of informa-
tion; the fabric of society depends increasingly on the secrecy,
integrity, and availability of information. Another, more subtle
factor is the revolution in cryptography brought about by the
invention of public key cryptography [2], [3]. This turned cryp-
tography from being a black art practiced in the confines of gov-
ernment establishments to a respectable and thriving academic
discipline.
The result is that mathematical tools and techniques for the
design and analysis of security critical systems now appear to
have reached a good degree of maturity. In this issue, the formal
analysis of a “real” (and indeed rather complex) electronic com-
merce protocol, secure electronic transactions (SET), is pre-
sented for example.
Mathematical analysis is not enough to ensure the security
of deployed security systems, or other critical systems for
that matter. The models on which the analysis is based will
inevitably be abstractions and approximations of reality. Our
system may be provably secure with respect to the model and
assumptions and yet be vulnerable to timing or differential
power attacks if these aspects of reality have been abstracted
away from the models. Furthermore, many security failures are
actually due to nontechnical attacks, social engineering and the
like. Nonetheless, there is great value in mathematical modeling
and analysis and making explicit underlying assumptions.
The fact that the field is of such great importance and that
many challenges remain, both theoretical and practical, is en-
suring that this remains an active and indeed growing research
area. The reader will find indications of many of the open ques-
tions and challenges in the papers. The analysis of security pro-
tocols has been particularly active and Meadows’ paper gives
the reader an accurate indication of where the current activity is
concentrated.
In this special issue, we bring together a collection of
papers on a number of aspects of analysis techniques. In the
first paper, “Language-Based Information-Flow Security,” by
Sabelfeld and Myers present a wide-ranging survey of the
research from the late 1970s to the present, into the nature of
information flow and techniques for achieving it. The paper
particularly focuses on recently developed approaches based
on programming-language based techniques, and identifies a
number of open challenges for research in this area.
“Real-Time Information Flow Analysis,” by Focardi et al. is
concerned with the investigation of information flow properties
in the presence of timing considerations. The paper builds on
previous work in the security process algebra (SPA) by incor-
porating timing behavior into the model and considering the hi-
erarchy of noninterference properties in this new setting. The
paper demonstrates that timed analysis can identify insecurities
that are not apparent in the untimed model.
In “A Nonfunctional Approach to System Integrity,” by
Foley, proposes a framework for analysing integrity properties
of a system. He uses the process algebra communicating
sequential processes (CSP) to provide a definition of integrity
and shows how a number of integrity mechanisms, such as sep-
aration of duties, can be understood as ways of implementing
integrity. Foley identifies a relationship between integrity and
noninterference, which are both nonfunctional properties,
and consequently enhances our understanding of integrity.
The relationship allows for the possibility that techniques
for establishing noninterference might also be applicable to
integrity properties.
Verification methods for security protocols have seen an ex-
plosion of activity over the last decade, with the development
of significant new ideas which have transformed ways in which
such protocols can be analyzed. Meadows gives a comprehen-
sive overview of this field in, “Formal Methods for Crypto-
graphic Protocol Analysis: Emerging Issues and Trends,” and
identifies the problems that now need to be addressed to extend
the application of the techniques and tools that have so far been
developed.
The paper, “Posets and Protocols—Picking the Right Three-
Party Protocol,” by Ng, shows how security protocols can be
optimized by transforming the protocol steps in ways that pre-
serve its original goals. Formal justification for the transforma-
tion steps is grounded in the strand space framework for protocol
analysis, providing a novel application of that protocol verifica-
tion framework.
Design techniques are often made practical by the provision
of tool support. The paper, “Enhanced Security Protocol En-
gineering Through a Unified Multidimensional Framework,”
by Saul and Hutchison, presents Security Protcol Engineering
and Analysis Resource II (SPEAR II), a tool that integrates
four components useful for protocol analysis: specification,
a belief logic, an analysis engine for that belief logic, and a
message round calculator. The paper demonstrates that these
components integrate into a tool useful for protocol design and
analysis.
Formal verification of commercial protocols is difficult be-
cause of the sheer size of the protocols involved. In “Verifying
the SET Registration Protocols,” by Bella et al., apply the
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inductive method in Isabelle/Hol to modeling the registration
part of the SET e-commerce protocol and verifying secrecy
properties of it. The paper gives a flavor of the scale of this
task, not least the modeling process which enables the formal
verification to proceed.
In “Authentication by Correspondence,” Gollmann reviews
the use of correspondence properties to characterize authentica-
tion. He explores the history of this approach to authentication,
how it has evolved, and the variety of such properties that now
abound in the literature. Gollmann argues that correspondence
properties sometimes, but not always, capture authentication
properties, and that their use in protocol verification is, there-
fore, not always appropriate: the use of correspondence proper-
ties as a formal specification of authentication requires careful
consideration of the security requirements being modeled.
The final paper in this Special Issue is concerned with the im-
portant problem of intrusion detection, for which formal frame-
works are now beginning to emerge. “Determining the Opera-
tional Limits of an Anomaly-Based Intrusion Detector,” by Tan
and Maxion, investigates the anomaly detector “stide” and its
underlying algorithm and obtains a theoretical justification for
empirical observations about the minimal information required
for stide to identify intrusions effectively. This information is
given in terms of the window length used to consider the be-
havior of processes running on a system and the paper estab-
lishes the lower bound of six by reasoned rather than ad hoc
means. The paper provides a showcase of how a formal frame-
work can be developed and applied to understanding aspects of
intrusion detection.
The editors would like to thank all the authors who submitted
papers to this Special Issue. Thanks are also due to the anony-
mous referees for their reviews and to J-SAC for their assistance
in preparing this special issue.
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